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Abstract
Motor fuel taxes form a great part of the total revenue collected for the devel-
opment and maintenance of surface transportation. Gasoline tax payments
are becoming a matter of concern as the share of Battery Vehicles (BVs)
increases in the market. Those funds need to be collected in some other way
in light of the decreased gasoline sales.
In the recent years, a concept of mileage-based tax, called Vehicle Miles
Traveled (VMT) tax, has been developed to address this concern. This ap-
proach calculates tax by monitoring vehicle road usage through GPS and
odometer data. GPS data determines vehicle’s region and the rate per mile
to be assessed. The number of miles driven is taken from the odometer.
Collection of fine-grained GPS data is privacy invasive and has been a
strong reason against adoption of VMT tax. Coarsening the location depen-
dent data does not help either. Ensuring secure computation of the data,
and validation of GPS signals also of prime concern as the user might tamper
with the system to report less miles.
We propose Privacy-Preserving Vehicles Miles Traveled (PPVMT) tax
based on additive secret-sharing to solve the privacy issues. In our model,
the car computes the total miles driven in each (tax jurisdiction) region. The
car splits the total miles of each region into random looking numbers which
can later be aggregated in a specific manner to determine tax owed by each
user and tax share of each region.
We also propose ‘Car-as-a-Smartphone’ model which reasons that features
available in a car in the near future will be similar to a current smartphone.
To detect system tampering and signal spoofing, we propose validation of
the untrusted data from GPS and odometer with inertial motion sensors.
We implemented a technique to verify the pattern of location coordinates
reported by the GPS in the car from the gyroscope data. The technique
raises the cost and the skill required to tamper with the system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The price for motor fuel at gas stations consists of the commodity price
plus taxes charged by federal, state and, in certain cases, local governments.
These taxes are used for the maintenance and improvement/expansion of
the surface transportation infrastructure for vehicular traffic. The deepening
penetration of Battery Vehicles (BVs), which use the ‘fuel’ from the power
grid, threatens to reduce such funding substantially.
Covering up the revenue deficit can be done in many different ways.
 One strategy would be to charge BV buyers a high registration fee at
the time of vehicle purchase. This will be an impractical and unfair
mechanism as some cars are driven significantly more than others. A
person driving less will end up subsidizing the cost for the person who
drives more. Besides, some cars function for more years than others.
Such cars use the infrastructure more than other cars leading to another
inequality.
 Taxing car batteries to recover the cost can be another strategy but one
can argue about its practicality and fairness. Each battery is functional
for different length of time. Generally, batteries last for long time and
to cover the cost of infrastructure usage at the time of purchase would
require charging customers a high amount of tax. It will be unfair as
some batteries might not last long.
 Taxing the power used for charging a BV from electric grid can also be
a potential solution but it is hard to implement effectively. Currently,
many BVs can be charged from domestic sockets and implementing
this system will require standardization and regularization of electric-
ity transfer from grid to car. Also, laws would need to be setup to
transfer the money collected to the transportation authorities. But
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the major issue is that the system will be easy to circumvent by cus-
tom equipment or unauthorized personnel. Converting electricity to
charge the batteries requires modest skills that many people possess.
Consumers can utilize the electricity meant for household purposes for
charging their cars which will make be difficult to monitor and collect
the tax for the electricity consumed for charging cars.
 Taxing vehicles proportionately to the number of miles driven, com-
monly known as Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) tax, seems to be the
most reasonable choice as it taxes motorists based on their use of surface
transportation infrastructure. This technique is fair to the motorists
as they pay on the basis of their usage. On top of this, the VMT tax is
not dependent on the type of fuel used. If we get hydrogen or any other
fuel car in the future, this tax can still collect the correct tax amount.
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Figure 1.1: Gasoline Tax Map (Source: American Petroleum Institute)
VMT tax has two variants: one monitors location of the vehicle (mostly
using GPS) and the other does not. Monitoring location allows different
2
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Figure 1.2: Diesel Tax Map (Source: American Petroleum Institute)
geographical regions to have different tax rates. Every state (and many
regional authorities [1]) charges their own tax on the motor fuel on top of
the tax collected by federal government. The federal government charges tax
at 18.3 cents per gallon for gasoline and 24.3 cents per gallon for diesel [2].
Figure 1.1 maps total gasoline taxes and Figure 1.2 maps total diesel taxes
of 2014 in each state. The gasoline prices vary by more than 100% between
Alaska and New York.
Location recording, however, is privacy invasive and is a major obstacle
to the acceptance of this tax. It has been shown that location traces can
be used to infer personal information and activities ([3, 4]). For instance,
location traces of a person can be used to infer the address of the house
and the office. Knowing this, a web search on the social media or websites,
which allow searching for people based on their personal information, can
reveal more information about the person. Similarly, the data can also be
used to find the visits to a hospital, vacation spots, grocery store, and many
other personal preferences. Finding the number of visits to hospitals can be
3
privacy invasive as it may reveal the disease. For instance, if the visits are
very frequent, and if it is a cancer hospital, it is safe to conclude that the
person or some other family member has cancer.
To protect the privacy of the user, we propose Privacy-Preserving Vehicles
Miles Traveled (PPVMT) tax. In this, we provide the benefit of location
tracking in the VMT tax, viz. the ability to determine the tax amount of a
region, without invading the location privacy of the user. We accomplish it
by computing the total miles driven in each (tax jurisdiction) region locally
on the car. When it is time to upload the information for tax computation,
the car splits the total miles accumulated in each region into random look-
ing numbers whose sum is the mileage in that region. The splits are sent
to non-colluding servers which perform aggregation on data coming from a
potentially large number of cars in a specific manner. The servers, even if
they have all the information about the car, cannot infer any information
about the location or the miles driven in each region. The aggregated result
from all the servers is sent to the authority responsible for taxing users and
allocating the tax amount to each government. The data is again aggregated
by the authority in a specific manner to determine tax owed by each user
and tax share of each region.
Not all of the cars today support the processing power required to perform
the local computation. Some cars come with processing power to run custom
applications, in-built Internet connectivity, GPS and navigation. Such cars
should be able to do the calculation and send the data to the servers. For
cars incapable for doing the calculation, installing an external device, either
a on-board computer or a OBD-II (Onboard Diagnostic) compatible device,
can work.
Cars manufacturers are constantly coming with new features and, with
that in mind, we propose ‘Car-as-a-Smartphone’ model which reasons that
features available in a car in the near future will be similar to a current smart-
phone. These cars will be able to run third party applications and provide
powerful processing power. In such an environment, the tax application can
run as an application offered by the government.
A user has the incentive to tamper with the system to lower his tax
amount. The current generation of cars is highly insecure and vulnerable
to exploits. [5] has shown that it is possible to compromise even the critical
functions in a car, such as the brakes of the car, and overwrite the software
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in the car with a custom software without raising any suspicion. In VMT
tax scenario, the tampering can be done at different stages:
1. GPS signals may be blocked by jamming or the receiver may be enclosed
in a Faraday cage, resulting in no data.
2. The odometer may be compromised to not report any distance covered.
3. The software performing the computations may be compromised such
that it lowers the tax amount
4. Data coming from GPS receiver or odometer may be modified by some
custom middle hardware installed by the user.
5. GPS signals can be spoofed such that the receiver reports false locations
to lower the tax amount. The falsified location coordinates may lie in
a tax jurisdiction with lower tax rate per mile.
The first two are easy to detect with inertial motion sensors. If the GPS
or the odometer does not respond but the motion sensors get measurements
of driving, it may be a case of some fault or tampering. PPVMT assumes
that car manufacturers take steps to prevent or detect the third scenario.
PPVMT provides tamper resistance to tackle the fourth and fifth scenario.
GPS and odometer readings can be spoofed as value recorded depends
on external electromagnetic signals. Though there are techniques to detect
spoofing, there is no guarantee that a more sophisticated attack can be de-
tected or prevented. We believe that using inertial motions sensors, which
provide measurements from the mechanics of a moving car, can validate the
GPS location trace and odometer data to detect tampering. Accelerometer
and gyroscope data can be compared with timestamped GPS and odometer
data to match the characteristics of the car movement.
We implemented a technique to verify the pattern of location coordinates
reported by the GPS in the Car from the gyroscope data. Gyroscope, which
measures angular velocity, reports measurements when the car takes a turn.
This turn can be compared with the GPS data to determine if something is
amiss. An Android app has been developed as a proof-of-concept with good
results.
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1.1 Objective
This thesis was developed with the following goals:
 Recognize the problem of decreasing revenue for surface transporta-
tion infrastructure development and maintenance because of reduced
gasoline sales
 Develop requirements for any Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) tax solu-
tion which can allocate the tax to the governments based on the miles
driven by vehicles in that region
 Design a solution for VMT tax, satisfying the requirements, such that
is protects the location privacy of the motorists
 Incorporate tamper resistance in the design to prevent users to from
decreasing their tax amounts
 Develop a proof-of-concept of the proposed design
1.2 Contribution
Contributions of the thesis include:
 Developed functional, performance, security and policy requirements
for a VMT tax solution, acknowledging the entities that will get affected
by a VMT tax
 Proposed an architecture to calculate VMT tax and allocate the tax
amount proportionately to all the jurisdictions
 Incorporated location privacy-protection in the design to prevent any
leakage of personal information
 Proposed a tamper-resistance model which validates untrusted GPS
and odometer data by checking the values against inertial motion sensor
measurements
 Implemented a proof-of-concept of privacy-preserving technique and
tamper resistance on Android by validating GPS data against gyro-
scope measurements
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 Conducted field tests to collect GPS and gyroscope data and to develop
a model for verifying genuineness of GPS data using gyroscope data
1.3 Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the moti-
vation behind the problem and the background required to follow rest of the
thesis. The main motivation of decreasing revenues due to reduced gasoline
sales has been discussed. It also mentions various other automobile taxation
systems in place. It provides the motivation behind securing the electronic
system of the current generation of cars. It explains Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS) and inertial motions sensors in Android. Chapter 3 describes
the threat to motorists’ privacy because of location monitoring and inference
attacks. It also overviews cyber-security issues in the automobiles. Chap-
ter 4 provides the functional, performance, security and policy requirements
for a VMT tax solution. Chapter 5 proposes PPVMT tax design and the
mechanism to compute taxes of each individual and the governments. It also
suggests ways to provide tamper resistance. Chapter 6 proposes ‘Car-as-a-
Smartphone’ model and provides details of the implementation, including the
model to validate GPS data from gyroscope measurements in a car. Chapter
7 discusses on other VMT projects, Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD) insurance,
smart meters and GPS spoofing countermeasures. Chapter 8, the last chap-
ter, concludes the thesis with a summary and potential of this technology in
problems. It also outlines directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Motivation and Background
This chapter presents some financial figures which are the main motivation
for the governments to pursue VMT tax. It also presents relevant informa-
tion about GPS, inertial motion sensors and the current state of automobile
cybersecurity. The background information on these topics will help reason
about the design and implementation decisions which appear later in the
thesis.
2.1 Automobile Taxation
The revenue for surface transportation infrastructure has reached really low
as compared to outlays. One example of deficit is Highway Trust Fund (HTF)
administered by United States Department of Transportation. This fund re-
ceives the federal part of the tax from fuel sales. It is the primary financing
mechanism for the nation’s surface transportation system. According to Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO), cash outflows have outpaced tax revenues
in HTF since 2001 and revenue from gasoline tax has declined over the 2010-
2013 period. In the 2008-2014 period, $54 billion were transferred from the
general fund of the Treasury to the HTF to make up for the shortfall [6].
In its April 2014 baseline for programs funded from the highway account,
CBO projects outlays of $465 billion and revenues of $343 billion from 2015
through 2024, resulting in a cumulative shortfall of about $120 billion in 2024
in its highway account (Figure 2.1). The Figure plots the receipts, outlays,
and balance or shortfall of the highway account for the Highway Trust Fund
under Congressional Budget Office’s April 2014 baseline.
VMT tax has been deployed worldwide but is commonly applied to only
trucks. New Zealand applies it to all heavy vehicles and cars running on
untaxed fuel (includes diesel and excludes petrol, CNG, and LPG) [7]. The
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Figure 2.1: Highway Account of Highway Trust Fund (in Billions of
Dollars)(Source: http://www.cbo.gov/publication/45416)
tax has been proposed in many states in USA and but has not been enforced
on general public. Oregon has taken the lead by passing Senate Bill 810 [8].
It is a voluntary program for up to 5,000 motorists and becomes operational
from July 1, 2015. Participants will be charged a rate of 1.5 cents per mile
and 50% of the money collected will be allocated to the Department of Trans-
portation, 30% to counties and 20% to cities irrespective of miles driven in
any county or city. The bill has been made for VMT tax without location
monitoring and does not enforce a location monitoring mechanism.
Currently, there is no standardized VMT tax collection mechanism for
personal vehicles. One technique can be to appoint a set of authorized en-
tities which manually inspect the car and record odometer readings. Such a
mechanism will be very expensive to execute on a large scale because of the
labor costs involved. Another option is to ask motorists to report the mileage
from their cars to the authority or buy a pre-paid license. For example, New
Zealand Transport Agency expect motorists to buy the license in 1000 km
units[7] before driving the vehicle. The process is not very user friendly,
wastes many man hours and trusts the people to buy a license. A popular
choice has been a use of an external on-board computers (or On-Board Unit
(OBU)) in the cars. Cars are modified to integrate these small computers
which record the value from odometer and may have location monitoring and
Internet connectivity. This mechanism requires one time installation of the
unit and manual intervention only when there is an issue such as the unit
9
going bad. The major downside is the cost of the unit. In US alone, there
are more than 250 million cars on the road and installing a $30 unit will
cost $7.5 billion excluding labor and other charges. Setting up the IT infras-
tructure will be another cost but it should be a small fraction of the cost
of the units. Cars with in-built Internet connectivity and capability of run-
ning custom software can send the relevant data to the servers automatically.
Cars supporting features such as CarPlay from Apple [9], which connects the
smartphone to the car and allows for data exchange, can use the smartphone
to send the data to the servers. The downside of the approach is that not all
cars on the road today support such system. Currently, these are available
only in luxury cars and few mid-range cars.
Without location monitoring, people would end up paying taxes for driving
in private areas and regions not maintained by the charging authority. For
instance, volunteers paying VMT tax to a state will end up paying taxes for
driving in other states. Even in a state, taxes will need to be averaged for
all regions and people living in areas with lesser tax rates and lower cost of
living end up subsidizing for people living in areas with higher cost of living.
2.2 Automobile Cybersecurity
Automobiles today contain Electronic Control Units (ECUs) which ensure
a wide range of functionality, including engine control, brakes, lights, com-
munication and the entertainment system. A modern automobile may con-
tain 70-100 ECUs, running millions of lines of code [10]. Until some years
ago, an automobile was a network of ECUs with no connectivity to outside
world. It has changed with the introduction of wireless communication in
cars. Unfortunately, the software stack running the components still uses
the old, vulnerable software or its variants. Current cars have old Unix-like
environment supporting electronic system of the car [5]. Since the software
present on most of the cars cannot be updated without taking the car to
the mechanic, vulnerabilities in the software stay with the car. With addi-
tional features coming to the cars, the number of ECUs and the amount of
code, both are increasing. Cars now support GPS and navigation along with
Internet connectivity.
Weak security of the car’s architecture and software allows an attacker to
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inject packets wirelessly to compromise car components. The weak internal
security mechanism allows a compromised component to exploit other com-
ponents. Bluetooth, telematics unit, and Tire Pressure Monitoring System
(TPMS) have been shown to be vulnerable to such attacks [11, 12].
All cars in US since 2008 run CAN (Controller Area Network) protocol to
deliver message from one component to another. It is a link layer protocol
without any inbuilt security mechanism (ISO 11898 [13]). The broadcast
nature of the CAN protocol allows any malicious component on the network
to snoop on all the communications and send packets to other components.
Absence of source identifiers or authenticator fields in the CAN protocol and a
weak access control mechanism allow a non-critical compromised component
to send malicious packets to critical components without getting identified.
Researchers have been able to exploit and control critical and non-critical
components of a car through wired OBD-II port (available in all cars in US
after 1996) while the car was running [5]. Attacks through OBD-II port are
difficult to execute as the port is present inside the car and requires access
to the car.
There have been past projects to improve the security of the vehicle.
OVERSEE (Open VEhiculaR SEcurE platform) was one such project to
provide a secure, standardized and generic communication and application
platform for vehicles [14]. It aimed to create a single point of access to in-
ternal and external communication channels. There is not much information
about the final outcome of the project which ended in 2011.
2.3 Global Positioning System (GPS)
GPS is a satellite based navigation system which provides location informa-
tion. A GPS receiver records the signal from the satellite and triangulates the
location based on the information in the signals. The receiver can determine
its latitude, longitude and altitude.
There are currently more than 30 GPS satellites in operation. Each GPS
satellite continuously sends its location and the time at which the signal was
sent. The receiver records the time at which the signal was received. Using
the difference of the two times and the speed at which the signal travels, it
calculates the distance of the satellite from the receiver. Using the location
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and the distance from satellites, the receiver computes its position on earth.
Triangulation requires 4 or more GPS satellites in direct line of sight as
the GPS signal power is weak. It makes GPS unusable in building indoors
and covered parking lots. GPS triangulation requires distance of the satellite
from the receiver. Location calculation is erroneous if the calculated distance
has errors. This is often the case when the receiver is present among high
rise buildings. The reflected signals from buildings increase the travel time
of the signals leading to incorrect distance calculation.
A particular interest of this thesis is the use of GPS in Android and the
Location API (Application Programming Interface) provided by the open-
source mobile operating system. The API provides the app with geographic
latitude, longitude, altitude and accuracy from GPS. Accuracy in Android
is defined as radius of 68% confidence. In other words, if the location errors
are normally distributed, accuracy is the radius of one standard deviation
but errors like this do not follow normal distribution. Accuracy is highly
dependent upon the number of satellites visible, signal strength, or interrup-
tion by external factors. In an open area, GPS on Nexus 4 running Android
4.4.4 measured location with an accuracy of 9–11 meters. Having high rise
buildings or trees reduced it to 50 meters.
2.4 Motion Sensors
Motion sensors detect motion and output some predefined motion parameter.
Almost all the Android smartphones today are equipped with Accelerometer,
and Gyroscope. Motion sensors measure on the device’s local x, y and z axes
(Figure 2.2). Accelerometer measures the acceleration experienced by the
phone in m/sec2. When the phone is standstill, on a table with the screen
facing upwards, the x and y axes acceleration reads close to zero and the one
in the z axis, which reads acceleration due to gravity is close to 9.8m/sec2.
Gyroscope measures rate of rotation, in other words, angular speed, of the
phone along x, y and z axes.
Our interest lies in gyroscope which measures angular velocity in radi-
ans/sec. Due to inherent nature of the sensor, gyroscope measurements tend
to drift overtime. Android filters the drift before providing it to the app
by using the data from other sensors. The techniques used to achieve these
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results are called Sensor Fusion algorithms [15]. Android also provides un-
calibrated readings if required by any app.
Figure 2.2: Android Device Local Axes 1
While reading or calculating on any motion sensor data, different types of
errors can occur. Except the issue of time delays, all errors are generic and
occur in all sensors.
 Human Error : These are due to unintentional measurement by human
beings. For instance, a person may read a wrong value from the sensor.
 Systematic Error : These are because of the system in place and affect
the accuracy of the measured value. These are constant offset from the
true value. For instance, taking the measurement of magnetometer with
a magnet nearby will offset the actual reading by a constant amount.
 Noise - It is the random fluctuation in measurement. For instance,
even slight perturbation induced by phone speakers, can induce random
measurements in gyroscope.
 Drift : It occurs when the measurement wanders off the real-world value
after some long amount of time.
1Image property of Google Inc., under Creative Commons 2.5, http://developer.
android.com/guide/topics/sensors/sensors_overview.html
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 Offset or Bias : This error is inbuilt into sensor. It is different from
Systematic Error as it is without the influence of any external entity.
If the output of a sensor is not zero when the measured property is
zero, the sensor has an offset or bias. These values generally need to
be subtracted from all the readings.
 Time Delays and Dropped Data: Receiving and processing measured
data within a limited time period is a quality of Real-Time Operating
System (RTOS). Systems, such as Android, are not RTOS. The values
reported at any instance may not be the ones being sensed by the
sensor. In such a system, data is sometimes delayed or even dropped,
resulting in erroneous timestamps.
 Integration Error : Many times value measured from a sensor needs
to be integrated to find related value. For instance, gyroscope values
need to be integrated to find the total angle made by a car in a turn.
However, the values in the sensor drift overtime and the error due to
zero offset lead to incorrect integration of values. It is practical to
subtract the zero offset from the values and perform integration only
over a small time interval.
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Chapter 3
Threat
In this thesis, we target two threats to the system. The first threat is of
privacy invasiveness. Any information that helps adversary determine any
user’s personal activity is privacy invasive. Proposed VMT tax methodologies
collect location information and send it to the server, allowing untrusted
servers to access the private information which can be used to infer a lot of
other information about the user. The second threat to the system is that of
the security of the computation performed inside the vehicle and the integrity
of the data received from GPS and odometer. Current generation of cars is
vulnerable to many security attacks. It is even possible to change the code
running in the car by exploiting the components. Integrity of data received
from GPS and odometer is also at risk as the signals received by the system
can be modified or spoofed such that it results in less tax.
3.1 Privacy
A VMT tax system that collects location information can be privacy inva-
sive in many forms. A system monitoring the location collects timestamped,
fine grained geographical coordinates. The worst case occurs if all the ge-
ographic coordinates are sent as it is to the untrusted server for processing
and tax computation. Along with computing the required data, the server
can infer the movement patterns of the user, vacations taken, restaurants,
and hospitals visited, and many more. The users can be personally identified
solely based on the location and web search [3]. Home and work locations of
individuals can also be identified based on just location traces [4].
The server operator might have good intentions and the user might trust
it but the security of the data stored at the server cannot be guaranteed. To
overcome it, a VMT tax system may reduce the granularity of the locations
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for e.g. by just sending the miles driven in each jurisdiction. This move
will reduce adversary’s capability to determine some personal activities but
depending on the size of the region, it may still leak private information
about the whereabouts of a car. Regions with smaller geographic area will
allow adversary to predict information with better accuracy.
A 2010 document unearthed by American Civil Liberties Union of North
Carolina via a Freedom of Information Act claim reveals that most of the
cellular phone service providers store cell towers used by phones for more
than a year [16]. There is a very good chance that information about cell
towers used by cars equipped with cellular connections capabilities are also
stored for more than a year. The cell phone towers cover a large geographical
area and it is hard to pin point the location of the device through this data.
They can provide a rough estimate of a phone’s or car’s location. If the
phone or car is moving, it can shorten the possible list of locations by the
sequence of cell phone towers accessed by the car, the duration of time it was
with a cell tower and the maps of all the roads in the area. In this scenario,
the user has to trust private location data to cellphone companies. The user
doesn’t have any other option except to not use the cell phone service.
3.2 Security
A user can tamper with the system installed in the car in order to decrease
the tax amount. Tampering can be involved at any stage of the process. A
user can modify the signals coming from the wheels such that fewer miles
get reported in odometer. He can compromise the electronic system of the
car and modify the software or the stored data such that it lowers the tax
amount. Depending on the complexity of the process to compromise the
electronic system of the car, it may become popular among many users. If the
process requires little manual effort, is inexpensive, and is easy to distribute
while being hard to detect, we may see many people pursuing it. A difficult
process will require a technically skilled or highly motivation person, limiting
its spread.
For location, GPS is the most popular choice but it cannot be relied upon
for correct location information. GPS signals can be jammed to prevent
location recording at all. Having the receiver in a Faraday cage prevents
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the signal from reaching the receiver. The user can also use commercial
GPS jammers which interfere with the regular signals to render them useless
by inducing noise. Fortunately, jamming signals are easily detectable [17].
Spoofing GPS signals to deceive GPS receiver into calculating a fake location
is also possible [18]. Considerable work has been done to detect and prevent
spoofing but none of the published papers offer a fool-proof technique. A
more advanced adversary can always counter the anti-spoof techniques. GPS
spoofing has been discussed in section 7.4.
Current odometers are prone to tampering and hence, not reliable if used
along for mileage reporting[19]. There are two types of odometer tampering:
one changes the stored accumulated miles in the car and the other delivers
incorrect data from the wheel while the car is being driven. Most common
way to revert mechanical odometers values is to attach the odometer cable to
a drill and run it in reverse. Driving a car in reverse also decreases mechanical
odometer’s value. Reversing in some car models with digital odometers is
as easy as attaching a device to OBD-II (On-Board Diagnostics) port of the
car and overwriting a new value. Smelecom is one such company selling
digital mileage correction equipment [20]. For the other type of tampering,
illegal devices are sold in the markets which intercept the signal coming from
the wheel and the component responsible for odometer calculation. These
devices are man-in-the-middle and modify the values before it reaches the
component.
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Chapter 4
Requirements
This section aims to enumerate and describe the system requirements to be
fulfilled by any proposed solution of VMT tax. The requirements have been
modeled on the entities participating in the system. There are four require-
ment categories - functional, performance, policy, security and 5 participating
entities - Tax Authority, User, Car, and Governments.
4.1 Functional Requirements
These requirements define what the system is required to do and specify
the minimal abilities that the system must possess. The proposed solution
to the problem must be able to perform to meet at the very least of these
requirements.
 The system must tax the User based on the number of miles driven by
the Car.
The final tax amount charged to the User must be based on the number
of miles traveled by the Car. The rate per mile may not be constant
and depend on various factors viz. the type/make of the Car or the
region in which the Car is being driven.
 The system must be able to calculate and provide Tax Authority the
total tax generated by each Car. The privacy of User must be preserved
in the process.
 The system must able to provide Tax Authority just enough informa-
tion to determine the tax share of each Government from the total tax
collected.
Tax Authority allocates the tax collected to Federal and Regional Gov-
ernments. The information required to determine the tax proportion
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of each region must be conveyed to the Tax Authority. In the whole
process, no private data, in form comprehensible to either authority,
must be sent.
 The system must provide Tax Authority the minimum data required to
maintain tax records of the User. It may also provide additional data
if it does not invade User’s privacy.
Tax Authority having the minimal information is an ideal condition
but it may not be pragmatic. For example, at some point in time,
if an administrative authority needs to verify User’s identity or the
Car, it will require more than the bare minimal information. However,
irrespective of the type of information the authority can hold, it must
not possess privacy invasive data in a comprehensible manner.
 The system must provide User with capability to challenge the final bill
amount. The data should also be auditable by an independent party who
cannot be influenced either by the Tax Authority or the User.
The system must allow User to verify and challenge its final tax amount.
The system must be capable of storing sufficient data to re-compute
the final tax amount. The integrity and authenticity of the data being
stored must by verifiable. The system may support tax computation
by an independent third party to resolve the conflict.
4.2 Performance Requirements
 The number of miles traveled must be collected from a reliable source.
The source may be the odometer of the Car.
As mentioned by Hanley and Kuhl, GPS is not a reliable technology for
continuous location monitoring [21]. The signals are satellite dependent
and any disruption in the signal (for e.g. by high rise buildings, tunnels,
dense trees, etc.) makes location determination unreliable and hence
the calculation of number of miles driven. Odometer on the other hand
can determine the number of miles travelled reliably with very less
error. GPS can be used to verify the number of miles travelled with
some error.
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 The Car must be able to send required information reliably to Govern-
mental Authority at specified intervals.
The Car will gather information on the number of miles travelled in a
particular region. This information will need to be communicated to
the Governmental Authority. The data transfer interval needs to be
at least as frequent as Government Authority specifies it. Accordingly,
the communication mechanism and the medium used for transmission
must be reliable enough to support the delayed reporting at appropriate
batch times.
 The communication mechanism between the Car and the User must
have adequate reliability to guarantee the deliverability of the infor-
mation. The mechanism should also be user-friendly to the ordinary
people.
Conditions of appropriate time intervals and reliable communication as
mentioned above apply here. Besides, the system should ensure that
the communication mechanism is easy to use for ordinary people. It
should also account for cases when a lay man is unable to fulfill its
duties.
 The system must ensure that the data made available/sent to the user
must have a copy. It must also ensure that the User privacy is not
violated in the process.
If some data is sent to the user, there is a good chance that the User
might lose that particular piece of data. To deal with such scenarios,
the system needs to make the data redundant. The data should also
be reliably retrievable whenever the requirement arises.
 The system must support the required resolution of the data.
Granularity of the data (odometer and GPS) provided by the hardware
must be equal or more than the one specified by Tax Authority. The
software of the system must be able to function smoothly for the de-
signed granularity. If the granularity is high, the size of the data to be
processed and its processing time will rise up for the same inexpensive
hardware. The hardware required to process more granular data in
sufficient time may cost extra.
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 The system must ensure the collection data rate as specified by Tax
Authority.
The data collection rate must provide smooth functioning. For ex-
ample, the GPS and the odometer data might be recorded every 10
seconds. If the Car enters another region within that 10 second period,
the collected data could be interpolated to calculate the miles in each
region. The collection rate will depend on the acceptable error specified
by Tax Authority.
4.3 Security Requirements
These requirements provide the security and privacy specification for the
system.
 The system must ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of all
the data transmitted from one entity to another.
All the data transmitted between any two entities in the system must
be encrypted to provide confidentiality and integrity verification. A
person eavesdropping on the data must not be able to view any part
it or be able to modify it without getting detected. The system must
also ensure the availability of data to be transmitted.
 The system must provide authentication for all the senders.
Whenever a data is being sent from one entity to another, the receiver
must be able to authenticate the sender of the data. For instance, if
the Car is transmitting data to Tax Authority, the authority should be
able to verify that the data was indeed sent by the Car.
 The system must ensure to the best of its ability that the hardware
and software of the device used for data collection and computation is
tamper resistant.
Any adversary must not be able to tamper with the hardware and the
software of the device being used for data collection or tax computa-
tion. If one does tamper with any part of the device, the device must
be able to detect it and take appropriate actions. The device should
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notify the Tax Authority or the entity responsible. The insecurity of
the electronics components of a car have been shown in [11, 5]. The
authors were able to reverse engineer and compromise many Electronic
Controller Units (ECUs). Much critical functionality like odometer
reading and brakes were compromised along with many others.
 The system must be able to detect any tampering with the hardware or
software. In case of any suspicious activity, it should be able to take
necessary steps to prevent any damage.
A malicious user might try to tamper with the device collecting the data
or provide fake data to the device. The device must use other mech-
anisms to determine the possibility of tampering. Various methods to
detect and protect against the device tampering have been discussed
in [22]. For example, an adversary may block GPS signals all together
using Faraday’s cage. The system should be able to detect it and take
necessary steps. In this case, reading odometer data or installing an
accelerometer in the device to detect car’s movement can help verify if
the car is moving. If the car is moving and GPS does not detect any
signal, the tax calculation may be done at some pre-defined high rate.
 The system must ensure that Tax Authority does not receive User’s
fine location data in readable form. If it receives it in encrypted form,
the system should ensure that there are no information leaks from the
data. If possible, the system can also ensure that the location data is
not available to anyone except the User.
 The system should minimize the side-channel and covert channel infor-
mation leaks.
All the known side-channel attacks against the devices deployed in the
system must be studied. They should be rendered fool-proof for as
many attacks as possible. The hardware and software may be re-
searched for any side-channel or covert channel information leak.
4.4 Policy Requirements
 The system must incorporate policy on information loss from the Car.
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The system must include policies to tackle the situations resulting in
data loss from the Car. It might occur due to an adversary attempt-
ing to tamper with the device or uncontrollable circumstances like car
crashes and storage destruction.
 The system should support uniform policy across a region. If the prices
are dynamic, the User must be notified about the prices through some
mechanism.
The policy of uniform rate in a region can be compared with the current
system of gas stations. When a person visits a gas station, he makes
a decision of buying gas based on the price at the station. If he feels
that the price is too high, he can try another gas station. He has a
choice of selecting the gas station based on the pricing. In our case,
if the rates vary within a region, the User must be made aware of the
rates for driving on a road. He must be able to take another path, if
available, if rates seem unfavorable to him.
 The system must include a mechanism to check sensors and computa-
tion for correctness. The system must support a verification mechanism
to determine if the hardware and software are working as expected.
There might be a human element involved in verification process. Pe-
riodic random checks on instruments can demoralize tampering.
 The system should have support for scenarios where the driver is not
the owner of the car and is not responsible for tax payment of the car.
Rental cars are the perfect example of this scenario. The system must
develop some mechanism to charge users, either though rental company
or directly to the driver of the car. It must be able to preserve privacy
of the driver in such cases too.
4.5 Participating Entities
These entities directly affect the working of the system. Later in the section,
we recognize some stakeholders in the process who either affect the system
or get affected by it in some manner.
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4.5.1 Tax Authority
This is the central governing body for the mileage-based taxation. It is a
part of federal government but can also be a private entity on a contract.
Functions
 The authority, with the help of other government agencies, specifies the
region boundaries and sets the price per mile of each region.
 It specifies the granularity of the data to be used for calculating the
taxes. It is presumed that the granularity defined by the Governmental
Authority is practical and can be achieved through inexpensive hard-
ware.
 It specifies the minimum frequency for data transmission from the Car.
The time interval must be practical enough to allow for system’s smooth
functioning
 It must also specify the maximum acceptable level of errors in the
collected raw data and tax calculations
 It must decide on the life of the data. If the car is storing data locally,
it needs to specify the minimum time for which the data must be kept
in the car. It also should specify the maximum time.
 It must define reliable communication and make policies for unreliable
communication.
 The entity must develop rules and regulations for rental vehicles and
taxis.
Responsibilities
 It issues tax statements to the User, collects taxes and maintaining tax
records.
 It is responsible for allocating the collected taxes to the transportation
authorities of respective regional governments and federal government.
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The amount allocated should depend on the number of miles driven by
the cars in the region.
 It may be responsible for the mechanism to compute taxes. The work
can be taken by a separate entity.
 It is responsible for handling User’s complaints and must provide the
services to process the audit requests.
4.5.2 User
A person registered with the Tax Authority for paying the mileage-based
tax. All the tax statements are issued in his/her name and he/she is the one
responsible for paying the tax for an automobile. User may be the owner of
the Car. It is up to the Tax Authority to decide the rules.
4.5.3 Car
It is the vehicle for which the tax is charged to the User. Number of miles
driven by the Car along with the type and model of the car should determine
the amount of tax.
4.5.4 Governments
These include the Federal government as well as the Regional Governments
administering tax jurisdictions. These entities handle the transportation
departments’ revenues and finance. They may be involved in developing or
maintaining surface transportation infrastructure.
4.5.5 Stakeholders
Stakeholders are the entities who affect or can be affected by the system. The
affects may be monetary, political, contractual, technological, etc. Stakehold-
ers, by definition include participating entities.
25
Automobile Manufacturer
Implementing the system on the automobiles may affect the way cars are
manufactured, programmed or serviced.
 All cars after 1996 have standard interfaces (OBD-II) to read the data
from the car. The electronic architecture is similar in most of the cars
(AUTOSAR) which helps in collection of data, such as from odome-
ter without requiring support from car manufacturer. Some cars have
different systems which require cooperation from the car manufacturer.
 If the system gets mandated, car manufacturers might want to integrate
the whole system in the car itself at the time of manufacturing.
 Car manufacturers will have to provide a methodology to verify that
the systems in the car are working correctly. It will be required when
a User wants to audit the tax imposed and the auditor wants to verify
the correct functioning of the equipment.
Communication Service Providers
They provide the service to transfer data to and from the Car to other en-
tities. They will have contract with the User, the Car manufacturer or Tax
Authority for reliable communication service.
Electronic Equipment Providers
These are the companies providing the equipment for mileage calculation,
cryptographic computations, etc. Their products and business will affect and
be affected by the system. These companies will be responsible for providing
secure and certified equipment with reliable performance and robustness.
They may be responsible for equipment management and service.
Standardizing Organizations
Organizations, such as IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engi-
neers) and SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers), who standardize various
mechanisms and protocols, might be involved in providing suggestions for
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standardizing some solution for VMT tax collection system. The process
will involve standardizing the hardware used for this purpose, the communi-
cation used to transfer the information, methodology used for tax calculation,
computation methodologies, tax distribution system, and many more.
Law Enforcement and Lawmakers
Agencies responsible for maintaining and upholding law will get additional
responsibilities. Lawmakers will be enacting laws for the agencies functioning
and policies for tampering with the system. The will also set up rules to
resolve disagreements between any two entities.
Law Firms
This system will require many contractual agreements among various enti-
ties. Law firms will be involved in detailed contract writing and representing
entities in legal proceedings for resolving conflicts.
Civil Rights
The system involves user privacy component and will affect the groups vouch-
ing for civil rights.
Energy Providers
The model of charging price per mile will change the number of miles driven
by users. It will affect the energy consumption, directly affecting the supply
and revenue of the energy providers, including but not limited to electric
utility companies and gas companies.
Traffic Analysis
Different price per mile for regions will affect the amount of traffic on different
routes. Traffic flow analysts will have to incorporate tax rate in their calcu-
lation even for regular roads and recalculate the flow. For future projects,
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the rate might be an important role and might be varied to change traffic
flows and develop infrastructure accordingly.
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Chapter 5
Design
The design of PPVMT is based on the system requirements presented in
section 4. While the design incorporates most of the functional and security
requirements, we do not focus on policy requirements. The performance
requirements have been discussed more in section 6.
The design of PPVMT primarily targets two problems: location privacy
preservation and tamper resistance. User’s location information should not
be accessible by anyone except the user and the user should not able to
tamper with the system easily. The design doesn’t aim to make the system
tamper proof. It aims to increase the cost and required effort to tamper with
the system by detecting tampering, imposing fines and making it hard to
tamper.
5.1 Entities
These are similar to the entities in section 4.5. One extra entity has been
added and more functionality and requirements have been added to the ex-
isting entities to support the design.
Car
It is the vehicle for which the tax is charged to the User. The car uses GPS,
inertial motion sensors (accelerometer and gyroscope) and odometer. The
Car also has computation power to perform cryptographic operations and
capability to generate pseudo-random bits required for secure computations.
Currently, all cars some with odometers but only few cars models come
with inbuilt GPS functionality. Gyroscopes are not present in current cars
but advancements in MEMS (MicroElectroMechanical Systems) technology
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have brought down the cost of motion sensors significantly. For instance, a
3-axis accelerometer and a 3-axis gyroscope are now available for less than
$5.
User
The person registered with the Tax Authority for paying the VMT tax. All
the tax statements are issued in his name and he is the one responsible for
paying the tax for an automobile.
Independent Server
There are at least two of these and the design requires that these servers
are non-colluding, preferably administered by different authorities who are
bound by law against collusion. Diverse arrangements are possible for the
entities handling the servers - the servers can be under private entities, one
under a private entity, and one under government, or both the servers under
the government. Having Independent Servers under private entities may be
perceived positively among general populace [21].
Tax Authority Server
The Tax Authority Server is responsible for determining the tax of Users
based on their mileage in each geographical region and allocating the total
tax collected to Regional and Federal Governments.
Governments
These are the government agencies responsible for surface transportation
infrastructure in their administrative regions.
Key Management Server (KMS)
This server stores and certifies the public certificate of all the entities in the
system. To verify the integrity and authenticity of the communication, all
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entities contact the Key Management Server to get the sender entity’s public
certificate.
5.2 Architectural Framework
Figure 5.1: Architectural Framework
The system ensures that location information of any user is not leaked to
any entity, yet the Tax Authority is able to compute taxes. The authority
does not learn anything except the tax of each user, and the tax share of
the federal and each regional government. The system also provides tamper
resistance against odometer and GPS spoofing. The design allows a copy
of the data generated from the car (fine grained location, odometer values,
and computed data) to be provided to the user, allowing him to do his own
calculation and verify the tax amount.
Figure 5.1 present the design of Privacy-Preserving Vehicle Miles Traveled
(PPVMT) tax system. The Car receives the location coordinates from the
GPS unit. The Car stores the regional boundaries and the pre-determined
tax rates of each region. The software running in the Car determines the
region in which the car is being driven and records the miles driven through
odometer data. Based on the policies and hardware, the system stores the
values for the specified period of time. When it is time to send the mileage
data to the server, it performs the privacy preserving cryptographic opera-
tions (Section 5.4) and sends the data to Independent Servers. The region
boundaries are stored on the Car itself and not queried from the server as es-
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tablishing a network connection to the server can give away the approximate
location of the car.
To lower his tax amount, a user can compromise the computation, spoof
the GPS signals or modify the data coming from odometer to report less
mileage. The design detects GPS signal spoofing and odometer tampering by
inertial motions sensors. This framework does not detect or prevent software
tampering. It assumes that all the computations in the car are performed
in the manner as expected by an untampered software. The car runs a
validation algorithm on the stream of data coming from GPS, accelerometer,
gyroscope and odometer which verifies the integrity of the data by cross-
checking the values. This can be done in many different ways, some of which
has been described in section 5.5. This design concerns itself only with fraud
detection. Reaction of the system to the fraud, for instance, whether to
charge a higher rate, report it to a server, mention the location and the time
of the car, is dependent on the law and policy decided by the Tax Authority.
This design consists of 2 Independent Servers. Each car splits its miles
into two values and sends it to each of the Independent Servers. This helps
in preserving privacy as none of the servers can find out the number of miles
traveled by any car in any of the regions. The servers perform aggregation
on the collected data periodically and send the aggregated value to the Tax
Authority server.
The Tax Authority server aggregates the data received from all the Inde-
pendent Servers, calculating tax owed by each individual User and computing
the amount to be allocated to each regional government. Based on the poli-
cies the Tax Authority notifies the User of the tax owed.
The User gets all the data signed by the Car. It includes the data that is
sent to the Independent Server as well as the private timestamped location
data. The location data enables the user to calculate its own tax as the
prices of each region are public. If there is any discrepancy in the amount,
the user can present the data signed by the car to the Tax Authority to
get the issue rectified. The User can get the data from the Car in multiple
manners. The Car either uses the inbuilt Internet connectivity to send the
data to the User, or transfers the data to the smartphone through wireless
Bluetooth or by wired connection, such as USB. It can also transfer the data
into a storage device which can be plugged into the Car. These methods are
a matter of availability, technical capability, policies, and user-friendliness.
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The frequency with which the data needs to be collected by the Indepen-
dent Servers and the Tax Authority server is determined by the Tax Author-
ity. The system can support highly periodic data reporting as well as with
longer intervals without compromising the location privacy of the User.
All network communications among entities use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
to prevent any eavesdropping or data modification. There exists a trusted
Certificate Authority (CA) which signs the public-key of every entity. If the
private key of a server gets leaked, it’s easy to replace but for cars, replacing
the key may not be easy. If the Car has Internet connectivity enabled, the
key can be updated over the network else the Car might need to be taken to
a certified mechanic.
5.3 Tax Computation
The methodology to compute total tax for each individual user as well as
each region has been shown in table 5.1. The technique has been described
using three cars and three regions but as we will see, the technique can be
scaled to any number of cars and any number of regions. The three cars
are - CAR1, CAR2, CAR3, and the three regions are - RGNA, RGNB, and
RGNC . The price per kilometer of each of the region is $PA, $PB and $PC .
Mjk represent the total number of KM driven in region j by car k.
Total tax owed by the user of the Car is the sum of tax owed in each region
which in turn is equal to price per KM times the distance driven. For car
CARk, the tax owed will be PA ∗MAk + PB ∗MBk + PC ∗MCk, as shown in
the last column of table 5.1.
Similarly, tax for each region is the total distance driven by all the vehicles
in that region times the price per KM of the region. For RGNj, the tax
amount from three cars comes out to be Pj ∗ (Mj1 +Mj2 +Mj3), as presented
in the last row of table 5.1.
Generalizing the solution for N cars and L regions,
Tax owed by CARk =
L∑
i=1
Pi ∗Mik (5.1)
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Table 5.1: PPVMT Tax Computation
and
Tax amount for RGNj = Pj ∗
N∑
i=1
Mji (5.2)
5.4 Preserving Location Privacy
As mentioned in section 3.1, sending the fine-grained geographic coordinates
as well as send the total miles covered in each region is privacy invasive. To
protect the privacy, we propose a mechanism based on additive secret sharing
scheme. A similar technique has been proposed in the past for aggregating
smart-meter data in a privacy enhanced manner [23].
For each region, the Car generates a random integer r and subtracts it to
the miles driven in that region to yield r′. rA1 and r′A1 represent the integers
generated by CAR1 for RGNA such that
rA1 + r
′
A1 = MA1 (5.3)
Table 5.2 shows all the integers generated for the three cars and the three
regions and the aggregation after replacing the miles with r and r′.
If the miles are not in integer, they can be multiplied by a power of 10
to make it an integer. For instance, if the miles reported extend two places
after the decimal, multiplication by 100 will yield the required integer. The
final aggregated sum can be offset by the same power of 10 to find the actual
value.
A car sends all its random numbers r to Independent Server 1 and r′ to
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Table 5.2: Tax computation with secrets
Table 5.3: Aggregation on Independent Server 1
Independent Server 2 (Table 5.3 and 5.4). Until and unless the two servers
collude, all the numbers will look completely random to either of the servers.
The servers cannot figure out the number of miles traveled by the car in any
of the regions. Both the servers aggregate the random integers in the manner
similar to finding tax for each user and region. It has been shown in the last
column of table 5.3 and 5.4 for the sample case. Generalizing for N cars and
L regions, computation on Independent Server 1 will be
Aggregation for CARk =
L∑
i=1
Pi ∗ rik (5.4)
and
Aggregation for RGNj = Pj ∗
N∑
i=1
rji (5.5)
Independent Server 2 will perform exactly the same aggregation on r′.
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Table 5.4: Aggregation on Independent Server 2
Table 5.5: Aggregation on Tax Authority Server
Once all the operations for this set of data is completed, both the servers
send the aggregated values for each user and each region to Tax Authority
Server. In table 5.3 and 5.4, it corresponds to the last column and the last
row. Tax Authority server aggregates the corresponding value from each of
the Independent Server to yield the final value as shown in table 5.5. The
value of each element in last row and last column of table 5.5 is same as
table 5.2, which in turn, because of the equation 5.3, is same as table 5.1.
5.5 Tamper Resistance
A malicious user can try to alter the functioning of the system to reduce his
tax amount. GPS and odometer are prone to exploitation (Section 3.2) as
both of them can be compromised in some manner to report fake locations
and miles. To protect the system, tamper-resistant techniques needs to be
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applied [24].
Inertial motion sensors do not rely on any external electromagnetic signal
but on the mechanical forces acting on the sensors. These sensors are more
trustworthy than GPS or odometer as they are usually embedded in the
machinery or on the chip. Fiddling with them require high technical skills.
Also, they work on complementary set of data. Providing them with fake
data will again require high skill.
5.5.1 Accelerometer and Odometer
Accelerometer provides the acceleration of the car. If the data from the
odometer has high granularity and can be updated with a low latency (10
times a second should work), then the distance data can be numerically
differentiated two times with respect to time to determine the acceleration.
This acceleration can be matched with accelerometer at any instance of time
to determine if the odometer has been tampered.
5.5.2 Accelerometer and GPS
GPS provides geographical coordinates with some accuracy. For cheap GPS
receivers, such as the ones installed in Smartphones, the accuracy is around
9 meters. With errors as huge as 9 meters, it is impossible to detect fine-
grained position changes and hence, the acceleration. It might be possible
with highly accurate and precise GPS receivers but the number of errors that
can crop up in data transmission and receiving is really large, making the
cross-checking impractical to consider.
5.5.3 GPS and Odometer
Though GPS and odometer are both untrusted, comparing them can be
beneficial to get long term data comparison. The distance covered by the
GPS and the odometer over a long period of time should be the same within
some error bound. If the distances are very different, it means either one of
it has malfunctioned or has been tampered.
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5.5.4 GPS and Gyroscope
Gyroscope provides the rotation speed of the sensor. Whenever a vehicle
takes a turn, the gyroscope provides the angular speed which can be inte-
grated over short intervals to determine the angle turned by the vehicle. The
coordinates provided by the GPS should also conform to the angle turned
by the vehicle. Due to inaccuracy, noise and errors in data the angle covered
might not always be the same. If turning angles don’t match for many turns,
it can be concluded that the GPS has been tampered.
The above methodologies don’t ensure that all the spoofing and signal
modifications will be detected. It ensures that unsophisticated attacks can
be sensed. If the attacker modifies the GPS and the odometer values such
that it always lies below the error thresholds, the system will not be able to
detect it.
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Chapter 6
Implementation
This chapter presents the implementation of the design described in the
previous chapter. We propose ‘Car-as-a-Smartphone’ model and develop
a proof-of-concept of tamper resistance against GPS signal spoofing. The
authenticity of GPS coordinates is established by comparing the data with
gyroscope measurements in a running car. We also implement the additive
secret sharing technique for privacy protecting and evaluate its performance.
6.1 Car-as-a-Smartphone Model
In automotive industry, companies are not found collaborating as much as
computer industry. There is hardly any sharing of code with general public.
Automotive companies maintain competitive edge over each other based on
their technologies and implementation of existing technologies. Giving it
out as open-source hasn’t been a part of the industry. Also, giving out the
complete design of the cars and source code of the programs installed in
cars might reveal security loopholes and vulnerabilities, which may danger
the safety and security of the cars running on the road. Even if updates
patching the vulnerabilities are delivered, a big percentage of cars do not
support web based software update. Applying updates will require taking
the car to the mechanic and is at the sole discretion of the customer while
costing them money.
In the last decade, there have been positive developments with technol-
ogy and software sharing. In 2003, leading automotive manufacturers and
component suppliers started a worldwide cooperation to develop an open
and standardized software architecture known as AUTOSAR (AUTomotive
Open System ARchitecture) [25]. It is based on the principle, “Cooperate
on standards, compete on implementation”. It standardizes basic system
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functions and functional interfaces through specifications and automobiles
have to fulfill them to be AUTOSAR compliant. GENIVI Alliance is an-
other industry led effort [26]. In their own words, ”GENIVI is committed to
driving the broad adoption of an In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) open-source
development platform.”
Open Automotive Alliance (OAA), the latest among all, is an alliance of
technology companies (including Google) and automotive manufacturers to
bring Android to automobiles [27]. It aims for compatible use of Android
devices with cars. In the long run, the alliance also plans to enable the car
itself as a connected Android device.
Looking at the trends, we propose ’Car-as-a-Smartphone’ model. It hy-
pothesizes that the various features available in a near future car will be very
close to those of a smartphone. We emulate car functionality present in our
design through Android apps. As mentioned in section 2.2, the electronic
system of current cars has been shown to be highly vulnerable to devastating
attacks. We assume that the electronic system of our Car can neither be
overwritten by an unauthorized entity nor its functionality be modified by
malicious program or user. The operating system can perform correct com-
putation and the software doing the calculation for tax cannot be modified
or removed.
6.2 Information Flow
Figure 6.1: System Implementation
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Adopting the ’Car-as-a-Smartphone’ model, we perform all the operations
of a Car on Android Smartphone. The app on the phone collects data from
the GPS and the gyroscope, validates the GPS data using the techniques
discussed in section 6.4. If the data passes the validation test and is found
to be valid, the app calculates the miles traveled in each region and stores it
in the phone to be sent to Independent Servers.
According to the policy set by the Tax Authority, when the time arrives
to send the data to Independent Servers, the app splits the total miles into
random values for each region and sends it to the Independent Server along
with an identifying number of the app which in actual deployment would
represent the identifier of the car. The app sends all the data serialized as a
JSON string which gets deserialized at the servers.
Independent Servers aggregate the data as explained in section 5.4. The
time required for aggregation varies with the number of regions and number
of cars being aggregated (Section 6.6). Independent Servers send data to the
Tax Authority Server once the aggregation is complete. The time of sending
depends on the policy set by the Tax Authority and can be varied.
Tax Authority aggregates the data as show in table 5.5. Once the amount
has been computed for each user, the server sends the information about
the tax amount to the User through a web application in a browser or on a
mobile app.
The User gets to download and see the data stored by the PPVMT app.
The data consists of timestamped geographic coordinates from GPS. This
data is used the User to do his own calculation of the tax and verify the
amount calculated by Tax Authority.
6.3 Data Collection
Figure 6.2 plots gyroscope values recorded by an Android phone mounted on
the windshield of a car. While recording the data, the phone was mounted in
landscape view which led to the phone turning along x axis whenever the car
took a turn. These are visible as spikes in the data along x-axis. The data
was recorded using PPVMT Data Collector App (details in Section 6.3.1).
Android supports retrieval of measured value with different frequency. For
tamper resistance, reading the gyroscope value 10 times a sec turned out to
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Figure 6.2: Raw Gyroscope Values
Figure 6.3: Simple Moving Average (SMA) of Gyroscope Values
be sufficient for turn detection and integration to find turn angle.
There is a lot of noise on the data along y and z axes. High spikes for longer
periods on y and z axes would mostly occur when a car totals. Spikes along
y axis occur when the car breaks, bringing suspension system into action,
which rotates the car about y axis. As the car resets, the car rotates back
by almost the same amount leading to another spike in opposite direction.
Spikes around z axis occur when the car is turning or shifting lanes. The
42
suspension system rotates the car a small angle along the z-axis, registering
reading on the gyroscope. Besides these, random wobble of the device due
to imperfect holder, wobbling of the car due to uneven road and machinery
also leads to noise.
Averaging the gyroscope readings eliminates the noise as the noise values
are equally probable in opposite direction. Figure 6.3 plots the Simple Mov-
ing Average (SMA) of the same set of values in figure 6.2. The average at
any instance of time is the average of last 1.5 seconds of data. The noise
along the y and z axes gets eliminated and only the data along the x-axis,
representing the turns remains.
Similar to motion sensors, Android supports location retrieval at user de-
fined frequency but in the experiments, Android did not update GPS location
more than once per second. Such low frequency prevents the use of GPS for
determining linear acceleration but it is still useful for finding the turn angle.
6.3.1 PPVMT Data Collector App
Figure 6.4 is the main screen of the app which was used to collect data for
PPVMT Tamper Resistance. The data collected from the app was used to
make data validation model as presented in section 6.4.
For every trip, the app collects timestamped GPS location, gyroscope, and
linear acceleration values 10 times per second. The driver of the car entered
the miles from the odometer manually. This was to find out if the total
distance calculated by GPS is same as the one reported by odometer. For all
the 33 trips recorded, total miles from GPS matched the odometer readings.
The odometer in the car had the least count of 1 mile.
When the user presses Start Recording button on the app, it starts a
Service which runs indefinitely until the user presses End Recording. The
Server spawns a thread upon starting which records the GPS, gyroscope and
linear acceleration data 10 times a second. Though it writes the data to a
zip file to conserve space and reduce the data, the amount of data generated
was considerably small even for long trips. The data sizes and other metrics
are discussed in section 6.6.
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Figure 6.4: PPVMT Data Collector - Main Screen
6.4 Data Validation Algorithm
It aims to validate the GPS coordinates from gyroscope data on an Android
smartphone. The algorithm consists of 4 parts:
1. Determining turn from gyroscope measurements
2. Combining multiple turns into one if the they are within some seconds
3. Calculating angle from gyroscope and GPS data
4. Computing the validity score of the turn on various factors
6.4.1 Determining turn from gyroscope measurements
Turn detection is based on threshold filters. A spike in the x-axis can be
caused either by a turn, a curve in the road or by lane shifts. Therefore,
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Figure 6.5: Simple Moving Average (SMA) of Gyroscope Values
determining turns involves filtering if the car is drifting, if yes, then whether
the drift qualifies as a turn. The thresholds for drifts were determined by
visually inspecting the GPS and gyroscope data.
Car qualifies for a drift if the x-axis SMA of gyroscope values consistently
remains more than 0.015 rad/sec (0.86°/sec) for longer than 0.5 sec. When-
ever SMA drops below the drift threshold of 0.015 rad/sec, the drift is com-
plete. The system detects all such drifts and marks them as potential turns.
A qualifying drift qualifies for a turn if, during the whole during of the
drift, the SMA crosses the turn threshold of 0.15 rad/sec (8.6°/sec). If it
does, the system qualifies it as a turn and moves on the second step. If the
drift doesn’t qualify for a turn, it is discarded as the data mostly corresponds
to a lane change or a curve on the road.
6.4.2 Combining multiple turns
If there are two turns in quick succession, it is difficult to ascertain angle by
GPS coordinates as there is not enough data after the first turn and before
the start of second turn. To overcome this limitation, the algorithm combines
the two turns if the time between the end of the first turn and start of the
second turn is less than 3 seconds. Figure 6.6 shows two turns combined by
the algorithm. The black line shows the approximate path of the car and
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Figure 6.6: Combining two successive turns into one
has been constructed by joining two consecutive GPS locations by a straight
line. The blue line represents the GPS locations recorded when the car was
turning. It has been constructed by the same method as the black line.
Having 3 seconds of data after the turn can ascertain the angle calculated
through GPS in most of the scenarios.
6.4.3 Calculating angles
Once the turn has been ascertained, total angle turned by the car is calculated
by gyroscope and GPS coordinates.
Integrating gyroscope data along the x-axis over the duration of the turn
calculates the total angle covered. There are many methods to perform
numerical integration and can be found in [28]. The implementation uses
trapezoidal integration.
First, the GPS data needs to be filtered for random offsets as shown in
figure 6.7. The easiest way to filter such errors is by setting a maximum
speed for the vehicle and eliminating points which are impossible to reach
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Figure 6.7: Random offsets
with maximum speed. A maximum speed of 250 km/hr (155 miles/hr) (about
70 meters/sec) eliminates all such invalid points.
Computing angle from GPS is relatively more challenging than from gyro-
scope data. The angle formed by GPS coordinates are calculated by assuming
GPS coordinates on a plane instead of a sphere. Error due to this assumption
is small as the processing is done over a small area.
Non-functional technique
An incorrect technique was tried in the first attempt to find the angle of the
turn. It aggregated the angles between every two consecutive lines (formed
by three consecutive points) over the duration of the turn. Figure 6.8 presents
GPS data of a car being driven into a parking lot and then taken out. The
red line represents the GPS path of the turn when the car was entering the
parking lot and the yellow line represent the turn when the car was exiting
the parking lot. As visible on the figure, path formed by GPS coordinates
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Figure 6.8: Issue with trees and parking lots
changes randomly giving abrupt angles between lines. Sometimes the lines
forming the path intersect with each other making angle calculations difficult.
It is very difficult to ascertain whether the reflex angle or the angle opposite
to reflex angle needs to be taken into account. Selecting incorrect angles
leads to incorrect results in all such situations.
Another situation, which is very common at turns is waiting for the signal
before the turn (Figure 6.9). In such situations too, the GPS tend to calculate
different location, all in nearby places as shown by the circle in 6.9. It makes
angle calculation difficult through geometry. In the same figure, the turn
depicted by the red line is an example for the turn for which the angle can
be calculated accurately with high probability.
Functional technique
Another technique, and the technique used in the final implementation, finds
the direction of vehicle travel before and after the turn to measure the angle
of the turn. Let A and B be the unit direction vectors before and after the
turn. Angle between them can be found out by
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Figure 6.9: Issue at traffic signals
θ = arcsin(‖A×B‖) (6.1)
The result is in the range −pi/2 to pi/2. Integration of gyroscope angle
provides the actual angle made by the vehicle and lies outside this range for
all the turns making an obtuse angle. Calculating the sin equivalent angle
of the actual angle in −pi/2 to pi/2 range allows comparison of the angles.
Figure 6.10 shows two turns, a U-turn (turn 1) and a right angle turn
(turn 2). By using the above mentioned techniques of detecting turns and
GPS angles, angle calculated by gyroscope data for turn 1 comes out to be
179.63°and that by GPS data to be 2.7°. The arcsin equivalent of the gyro
angle is 0.37°. It allows for a direct comparison of angles.
Finding direction of travel
To ascertain the direction of travel before the turn, we trace the location
coordinates back in time until the distance from the start of the turn more
than the threshold of 30 meters. Similarly, for direction after the turn, we
trace the location forward in time until we find a location 30 meters away.
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Figure 6.10: Turn angles and arcsin
The direction of travel is the average of the vectors from the start or the end
of the turn till the location.
In an open area, GPS has an accuracy of 9-12 meters. 30 meters is 3 times
the accuracy to ensure that vehicle is moving in the desired direction.
In figure 6.10, A1 corresponds to the direction of travel before the turn 1
and B1 corresponds to the direction after the turn. The length of the vectors
in the figure is approximately 30 meters on ground. Same goes for turn 2.
In this figure, enough GPS data is available for before and after the turns
to get the direction of travel but this may not be the case all the time. The
availability, accuracy, and characteristic of the data, changes the confidence
in the turn.
6.4.4 Computing the validity score
Validity score determines the confidence in the turn. If the accuracy of the
GPS data is high (<15 meters), and enough data is available to determine
the direction of travel and turn angle, the validity score is 1.0.
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If enough data is not available, for instance, if the system encounters an-
other turn in less than 30 meters, if the car is in a multistory parking garage
where GPS is unavailable, or is sporadic with low accuracy because of trees,
validity score of the turn goes down.
In the current implementation, validity score goes down when any of the
following conditions occur.
 If the distance between any two consecutive turns is less than 30 me-
ters but greater than 9 meters and has high accuracy, validity score is
dropped by 0.1. If it has low accuracy (>20 m), we discard the turn
with validity of 0. If the distance is less than 9 meters (for example in
a parking lot), we discard the turn from validation checking. 9 meters
is the highest possible accuracy in Android GPS and any distance less
than 9 meters can occur due to inaccuracy.
 If enough data is not available before or after the turn. For instance, in
case the recording started or ended when the car was taking the turn,
that particular turn is discarded from checking.
 If the total period of turn becomes longer than 10 sec, errors due to
integration of gyroscope data become large. The system decreases the
validity by 0.1 in this scenario too.
 If the difference between the GPS angle and the gyroscope angle be-
comes more than 10 degrees, we reduce the validity by 0.3. In other
terms, if the available data is not good to ascertain the angle turned,
the validity is decreased where the data is bad, besides the decrease
when difference in the angle is beyond the threshold. Error can creep
in when the turn angle is around 90°. As shown in figure 6.10 for turn
2, if the turn angle is little more than 90°, the system reduces it to
less than 90 but close to it. In such cases, the difference in the GPS
angle and gyroscope angle will decrease, which might leading to higher
validity score than actual.
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6.5 Android App
The algorithm described in section 6.4 has been implemented as an Android
app, called PPVMT Data Validator.
6.5.1 PPVMT Data Validator
Figure 6.11: Main Screen
Figure 6.11 is the main screen of the app. The app first records the data
and then analyzes it for validity. It can analyze the collected data with 3
different GPS modes - Genuine, Standstill, and Random. Genuine mode
uses the GPS values as recorded by the app, Standstill feeds the validation
algorithm with a static GPS coordinate and Random just chooses any random
GPS coordinate.
Start Recording button starts the data recording on the permanent storage
as a file. It initiates a background service (Figure 6.12) which spawns a
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Figure 6.12: Recording data
thread for data collection and writing. Pressing the End Recording button
in the app stops the recording. Analyze button validates the collected data
according to the selected GPS mode. Gyro Angle is the angle in degrees,
calculated by gyroscope data. GPS Angle is the angle of the turn calculated
using GPS data. Difference is the difference in the GPS and gyroscope angle
and Validity Score is the validity parameter as discussed in section 6.4.
Figure 6.13 shows validation of a 39 minute trip using genuine GPS data.
The angle in the bracket next to actual turn angle is the sin equivalent angle
in the range of -90°to 90°. This is one of the good data sets where the
majority of driving, except the starting turns and the ending turns, occurred
on highways. The last three turns are in a multistory parking lot where GPS
is unavailable. Overall validity of turns for this data set is really good.
Figure 6.14 shows the algorithm in work with a static GPS location of
(37.36754001,-122.01043922). Since the distance covered is always 0.0 meters
(<9 meters), all the turns get discarded with every turn have a validity score
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Figure 6.13: Data analyzed with genuine GPS coordinates
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Figure 6.14: Data analyzed with a static GPS coordinate
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Figure 6.15: Data analyzed with random GPS coordinates
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of 0.0.
Figure 6.15 shows the algorithm in work with random generated geograph-
ical coordinates. Since the distance between randomly coordinates is really
high, all the points get eliminated by the maximum speed filter leading to
all turns getting discarded.
Validation of 39 min of driving took 7 seconds on Android Nexus 4 phone.
The time taken for processing in standstill and random GPS modes is longer
because the algorithm searches extensively for a location with distance more
than 30 meters before and after every turn. Only when it is not able to find
any, it ignores the turn.
6.6 Performance and Testing
6.6.1 Secret Sharing
United States consists of 3114 counties. Considering each county as a region
in itself, we tested the performance of aggregation on Independent Servers
and Tax Authority Server by varying the number of cars. The testing ma-
chine contained Intel i7-2600 CPU, 12 GB physical memory, Win 7 64 bit
and Java 7 update 51.
Figure 6.16 plots the time taken for aggregation on Independent Servers
versus the number of cars with 3114 regions. Since all the operations are
linearly dependent upon the number of cars, the time required increases
linearly.
Figure 6.17 plots the time taken by Tax Authority server for aggregation.
Even for 100K cars, the computations took sub-second time.
This test ran on a single thread and didn’t utilize multi-core capability.
Since the problem is embarrassingly parallel, performing the operations with
multiple cores will bring down the processing times significantly. The aggre-
gation can also be performed on highly parallel graphic cards to decrease the
processing time drastically.
57
Figure 6.16: Aggregation Performance of Independent Servers
Figure 6.17: Aggregation Performance of Tax Authority
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Chapter 7
Related Work
The idea of VMT tax has been there for quite some years now. Govern-
ments are actively pursuing various techniques to deploy the tax. Oregon
has already passed a Senate Bill for a pilot program, the first in the coun-
try. California and Massachusetts are other states where talks on VMT tax
are ongoing. In this Chapter we discuss the pilot programs that have been
undertaken to test the tax. We also talk about Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD)
insurance, privacy-preserving Smart Meter technologies, and GPS spoofing,
all of which relate directly to our work.
7.1 VMT Projects
Charging user based on the region and miles driven has been tested by uni-
versities and many government organizations. Some projects aimed to gather
data from motorists about their privacy preference and some aimed to de-
velop a proof-of-concept for VMT taxation. Apparently, one of the methods
of controlling congestion involves charging users who are in congestion zone.
This model of reducing congestion is similar to VMT and has been tested by
Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC) [29].
VMT Pilot Programs by Oregon
Oregon has leaded the states in charging users fuel taxes for maintenance
and construction of roads. It was the first state to initiating the fuel tax in
1919. Even today, it leads the nation by passing Senate Bill 810 [8] which
allows Oregon Department of Transportation to set up a mileage collection
system for 5,000 volunteer motorists beginning in 2015.
In 2001, Oregon formed the Road User Fee Task Force (RUFTF) to exam-
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ine alternatives for raising revenue. Oregon’s Department of Transportation
(ODOT), along with RUFTF conducted two pilot projects—Road User Fee
Pilot Program (RUFPP) [30] in 2007 and Road Usage Charge Pilot Program
(RUCPP) [31] in 2012. The results of RUCPP were instrumental in passing
of the SB 810. These projects were created to charge high efficiency vehicles
and not just BVs.
 Road User Fee Pilot Program (RUFPP) developed and tested “pay-at-
the-pump” approach in 2007 where the users’ cars contained on-vehicle
device with RF communication and GPS capabilities. At the gas pump,
the pumps identified the car by interacting with the device through RF.
After identifying the vehicle, the gas pump subtracted the tax amount
from the gasoline price. GPS was used to determine the amount of
the tax which the user paid later. The test was conducted with 285
subject vehicles but it failed to make it to the legislature because of
privacy concerns (mandated GPS), and cost of the required infrastruc-
ture. One concern was slow technology evolution if the technology was
not subjected to market forces.
 Road Usage Charge Pilot Program (RUCPP) With the concern of re-
ducing fuel tax revenues, RUCPP was launched in 2012 [31]. It removed
the GPS requirement, allowed private firms and provided many choices
for data collection, reporting and payment of the tax. The project tar-
geted high efficiency vehicles with at least 55 miles per gallon. The
users were charged a constant tax rate of 1.56 cents per mile. For this
pilot, ODOT contracted with Sanef to provide the reporting devices
used by the participants and do the data processing. These devices
connect to the OBD-II port of the car. The data collected depended
on the type of plan user enrolled in [32]. If the user enrolled in the plan
where location information was collected, he was exempt from taxes
for driving on non-state and private roads. The project concluded in
2013.
The program provided 5 different plans:
1. ODOT Flat Rate Plan: This plan didn’t depend on the miles
driven. The user paid a monthly fee of $45 with no device installed
in the car.
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2. ODOT Basic Plan: It included an OBD-II port compatible device
which provided ODOT with only mileage information.
3. Sanef Basic Plan: This plan is same as ODOT Basic Plan except
that the data was sent to Sanef instead of ODOT which allowed
users to view and pay their tax directly on the website.
4. Sanef Advanced Plan: This plan used a device with GPS. The
location information was sent to Sanef who charged for miles re-
ported only in Oregon.
5. Sanef Smartphone Plan: This plan used motorists’ smartphone for
location determination and data communication. The users had
to install an app developed by Sanef for location determination.
It allowed for mix of basic and advanced plans. The user had
the power to control when the location is monitored. Miles, for
which location was not monitored, were charged assuming they
were accumulated in Oregon.
National Evaluation of Mileage-Based Charges
The project was conducted by University of Iowa Public Policy Center [21].
It aimed to assess the technical feasibility and public acceptance of mile based
charges with location monitoring. In the 2 year field study, the road charges
were examined on the national and multi-jurisdictional scale with approxi-
mately 2,650 volunteers from 12 areas throughout the country. The charges
were accrued using a On-Board Computer (OBC) consisting of GPS and a
connection to OBD-II (On-Board Diagnostics) port of the car for odometer
and speedometer data. The computer also stored the region boundaries and
rate per mile for jurisdictions. The study accumulated more than 21 million
miles with an average of 9000 miles per participant.
The study quantified the GPS ability for determining locations. In the
study, 92.5% of the miles was measured successfully. 6.9% of miles re-
quired interpolation techniques and 0.6% could not be reliably assigned using
straightforward techniques. The study also assessed user acceptance. At the
start, more than 60% expressed a neutral or negative view but at the end
the system was rated favorable by 70% of the participants.
The paper does not mention any effort to secure the private information
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of the users. For privacy protection, it provided users with two options—an
invoice containing detailed information about the trips, and another with
no data except the total charges. The first option was privacy invasive but
allowed audit of the final tax amount. The second option preserved privacy
but did not have any audit mechanism. The users had to select between the
two and did not have any option of data audit with privacy protection which
PPVMT offers.
7.2 Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD) Insurance
Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD) insurance is similar to VMT tax as the user is
charged based on his driving. In this, the cost of insurance is dependent
upon the type, location, time of driving, distance driven, acceleration and
speed of the vehicle. The number of factors affecting the cost varies among
companies ([33] [34]). The basic idea is to measure the “safeness” of driving.
In PriPAYD, authors propose a privacy preserving design for PAYD insur-
ance [22]. It aggregates the data required by insurance company locally on
a machine installed in the car and allows only the user to access the fine
grained location data. The paper also discusses the privacy invasiveness of
GPS data and offers some solutions for tamper resistance. It acknowledges
GPS spoofing but does not provide any proof-of-concept.
7.3 Smart Meters
Smart Meters, assessing electricity consumption from power grid, can be
privacy invasive too. Fine grained energy consumption data can be used to
deduce which appliances are used in a house by a technique known as Non-
Intrusive Appliance Load Monitoring (NIALM) [35]. The problem statement
in this scenario is similar to VMT tax system - the utility provider needs to
receive enough information to make decisions without having access to fine
grained consumption data from each household. User privacy can also be
preserved by requiring user to do all the computations on the data on his
own machine and then send it to the provider with a proof [36]. Danezis
et al. [23] computes on encrypted readings, implemented by secret-sharing-
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based secure multi-party computation techniques. They also deploy secret-
sharing and data aggregation by non-colluding independent authorities.
7.4 GPS Spoofing
Vulnerability of GPS receivers to spoofing has been verified by several tests.
In 2013, researchers spoofed GPS signal being received by a $80M yacht and
altered it course while the yacht’s navigation system showed that the yacht
was moving at the correct path [37]. Humphreys et al. implemented a GPS
spoofer on a digital signal processor [18]. Numerous countermeasures have
been proposed to prevent GPS spoofing [38, 39]. Some of the countermea-
sures include,
 Checking the power of signals being received on antenna. Spoofed
signals have power higher than genuine signals from satellites.
 Checking the time of arrival of signal and ensuring that it lies in the
expected range.
 Checking the Doppler shift of the signal frequency.
 Recovering genuine satellite signals by residual analysis. It can be
checked with other signals for consistency to detect any spoofing
 Checking the integrity by Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
(RAIM) which uses redundant data from extra satellites. It ignores the
measurements which cause large navigation errors.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis described the problem of decreasing motor fuel taxes, leading to
a financial deficit for surface transportation infrastructure development and
maintenance. Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) tax is a reasonable alternative
to motor fuel taxes but allocating the tax collected to different governments
based on the infrastructure usage require monitoring location of motorists
which is privacy invasive.
The thesis proposes an architectural framework, called Privacy-Preserving
Vehicle Miles Traveled (PPVMT) tax which protects the location privacy of
the motorists. It accumulates total miles traveled in each region and erases
any fine grained location. Later, it splits it into values using additive secret
sharing and sends it for aggregation on non-colluding servers. The resultant
data is then aggregated by the authority responsible for taxation which then
calculates the tax owed by each user and the tax to be allocated to each
government.
To prevent system tampering, especially, spoofing of GPS and odometer
signals, we validate the incoming untrusted data using measurements from
inertial motion sensors. We also implemented a proof-of-concept on Android
which successfully detected GPS spoofing from gyroscope measurements.
The system has been developed for next generation of cars which will have
features similar to smartphone to support cryptographic computations and
secure processing. If implemented, the same system can also be used for
many different problems related to transportation.
 The system can be integrated with navigation systems similar to Google
Maps to allow motorists to choose between paths and minimize the cost
of travel.
 Toll collection can be implemented on the same system by considering
a section of the road as a region in itself.
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 It can be advanced to support temporal pricing which can help trans-
port authorities contain congestion by increasing the prices of regions
during high traffic hours. Prices can also be manipulated on the fly to
divert traffic and change traffic flows in a city.
 PPVMT can be equipped with techniques to determine safe driving
practices, leading to Privacy-Preserving Pay as you Drive (PPPAYD)
insurance.
 If the location of a vehicle can be estimated with high precision and
accuracy, parking charges can also be collected automatically without
invading the location privacy of the user.
VMT tax will remove the reliance on fuel for infrastructure revenue collec-
tion and has huge potential to affect the way taxes and other transportation
related charges are collected.
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